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with the UK their involvement varies. Why is this so? Scholarly work on Brexit so far focused on the European Parliament
or the UK parliament, while attention to NPs in the EU27 is scarce. This article fills this void in research by tracing the
Austrian and German parliaments’ activities in the Brexit negotiations. Despite similar institutional strength I find that the
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The reason for this is Brexit’s varying saliency in these two countries given their different levels of exposure to the UK’s
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1. Introduction
Negotiations on the withdrawal of the UK from the
EU have been under way since 2017. The European
Parliament (EP), according to Article 50 of the Treaty on
EU, will have to ratify an eventual agreement on the UK’s
withdrawal (Closa, 2019). Article 50 does not give any
formal role to national parliaments (NPs) in the context
of the withdrawal agreement. However, if an eventual
agreement on future UK–EU relations becomes a mixed
one, NPswill need to ratify it. It is therefore vital to under-
stand NPs’ roles and positions in the current withdrawal
negotiations. Yet, little attention has been paid to parlia-
ments in EU member states other than in the UK (except
for Christiansen & Fromage, 2019).
Given the sequence of Article 50 negotiations and
(likely) subsequent talks on a future UK–EU mixed agree-
ment, we may look at NPs in Brexit affairs against the
background of their engagement in EU negotiations of
international agreements. In these negotiations, NPs re-
cently claimed a right to ratification as was the case
in the EU–Canada Comprehensive and Economic Trade
Agreement (CETA): Indeed, the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) clarified that international agreements targeting in-
direct investments require consent by NPs (ECJ, 2017).
This is part of a larger trend whereby NPs actively scruti-
nize EU affairs due to their upgraded role since the Lisbon
Treaty (Cooper, 2012). Through mechanisms such as the
Barroso initiative, inter-parliamentary cooperation, and
scrutiny of national governments NPs have become in-
creasingly assertive of their roles in the negotiation of
EU international agreements (Jančić, 2017; Roederer-
Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). While NPs obviously have
no right to ratification on the Article 50 agreement, they
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can make use of the aforementioned instruments in the
withdrawal negotiations.
Recent research shows, however, that there is con-
siderable variation in parliamentary activities on EU af-
fairs between NPs (Auel & Christiansen, 2015; Winzen,
2012). This seems to apply to their engagement in EU
international negotiations, too (Jančić, 2017; Roederer-
Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). Regarding trade talks, par-
liaments in Austria and Germany vis-à-vis other NPs in
the EU recently stood out as intensive scrutinizers of
transatlantic agreements such as CETA. Yet, in the cur-
rent Brexit talks on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the
German Bundestag is much more extensively involved
than the Austrian Nationalrat as this article will show.
Why is this so?
Relying on theorization of saliency as a trigger for
parliaments’ activities on EU affairs (Auel & Christiansen,
2015), I argue that varying vulnerability of Austria and
Germany to Brexit explains the differing levels of en-
gagement in these negotiations. Even though both par-
liaments are considered strong legislatures with exten-
sive information and participation rights in EU affairs
(see Section 2; Pollak & Slominski, 2003), I find that the
German Bundestag is more involved in the Brexit ne-
gotiations than the Austrian Nationalrat. This is due to
Germany’s exposure to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU
while Brexit’s impact on Austria is of smaller magnitude.
In what follows, the article sets up the puzzle of two
strong NPs with varying involvement in the Brexit nego-
tiations. Second, I put forward alternative explanations
to NPs’ activities in these negotiations, which rest on
Euroscepticism and saliency of Brexit. Thereafter, I con-
ceptualize NPs’ involvement in Brexit affairs by covering
formal as well as informal measures. Based on this con-
ceptualization, the empirical section traces the Austrian
Nationalrat and the German Bundestag in the Article 50
negotiations. In doing so, I argue that the reason for the
Bundestag’s more intensive involvement is Germany’s
vulnerability to Brexit compared to little expected im-
pact in the case of Austria. The conclusion summarizes
the results and reflects on their implications for contin-
ued negotiations.
2. The Puzzle: Similar Strength, Different Involvement
Research on NPs in EU affairs identifies institutional
strength as an explanatory factor for NPs’ scrutiny activ-
ities (Auel & Höing, 2015). This is because it is costly in
terms of time and resources for members of parliament
(MPs) to collect information on EU affairs (De Ruiter,
2013, p. 1198). Therefore, parliaments need the formal
powers and capacity in order to perform these costly ex-
ercises (Ringe, 2010). Hence, one can assume that NPs
with high institutional strength in the context of EU poli-
tics are also more involved in Brexit affairs.
Yet, in the case of Brexit we observe varying involve-
ment of two very strong NPs. As I will show in the em-
pirical section of this article, the German Bundestag is
more intensively involved in the current Brexit negotia-
tions, especially on an informal level, compared to the
Austrian Nationalrat. At the same time, however, both
parliaments are considered particularly strong in affairs
(Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015a; Winzen, 2012).
Relying on the most recent ranking by Auel,
Rozenberg and Tacea (2015a, p. 293), the average in-
stitutional strength lies at about 0.7 for the German
Bundestag and above 0.5 for the Austrian Nationalrat.
These scores take into account information rights, capac-
ity of parliaments to process information as well as over-
sight instruments. The ranking is consistent with similar
quantitative rankings (Winzen, 2012) as well as qualita-
tive studies, which ascribe strong institutional prerequi-
sites to the Austrian and German parliaments (Pollak &
Slominski, 2003). In fact, the Austrian Nationalrat is con-
sidered by scholarly literature as “exceptionally strong”
(Pollak & Slominski, 2003, p. 723) and placed “in the
same league as Germany” (p. 724).
Further to institutional strength, one might expect
a stronger involvement of the German Bundestag com-
pared to the Austrian Nationalrat given the sheer size
of Parliament and political weight of the country. The
absolute size of 709 compared to 183 parliamentarians
in the Bundestag and Nationalrat respectively would ac-
cordingly translate into a higher level of activity by the
German vis-à-vis the Austrian NP. Auel et al. (2015a,
p. 78–79), however, show a positive correlation between
institutional strength—rather than size of a parliament—
and the level of parliamentary activity. Indeed, the par-
liaments’ average activity scores on EU affairs are much
alike: 0.34 for the German Bundestag and the Austrian
Nationalrat is at 0.22. Hence, institutional strength and
the parliaments’ size lend little explanatory power towhy
the German Bundestag is more involved in Brexit than
the Austrian Nationalrat.
What alternative explanations can we turn to in or-
der to account for NPs’ activities in the Brexit negotia-
tions? In what follows, I link literature on NPs in EU af-
fairs (e.g., Auel, Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015b) to theoriza-
tion of saliency (e.g., Rauh, 2018). More specifically, I de-
velop an argument according to which vulnerability of a
country to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU results in an
intensive parliamentary involvement via saliency. I con-
trast this argument to alternative expectations based on
party politics, including the role of Euroscepticism (e.g.,
Auel & Höing, 2015).
3. Explaining NPs’ Involvement in Brexit
Institutional strength can arguably not explain NPs’ vary-
ing involvement in the Brexit negotiations (see Section 2).
Alternative explanations in the literature revolve around
actors’ “willingness to invest political resources to influ-
ence political outcomes” (Beyers, Dür, & Wonka, 2018,
p. 6). Scholarship puts forward two reasons for why par-
liamentarians might be willing to invest resources in
an EU issue: the degree of Euroscepticism and party
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politics (e.g., Auel & Höing, 2015) as well as politi-
cization or saliency of a political event (e.g., Auel &
Christiansen, 2015).
One strand in the literature on NPs in EU affairs
theorizes the role of party politics through parliament-
government relations. More specifically, scholars ana-
lyze the composition of government (Holzhacker, 2002)
and the share of Eurosceptic political groups in parlia-
ment (Auel & Höing, 2015). With a view to the com-
position of government, Saalfeld (2005, p. 357) sug-
gests more intensive parliamentary activities in cases of
minority or coalition governments compared to single-
party majority governments. In the cases of the Austrian
Nationalrat and the German Bundestag, however, we are
concerned with coalition governments only: grand coali-
tions in Germany as well as in Austria prior to the 2017
elections followed by a coalition in Austria composed of
the conservative (Austrian People’s Party [ÖVP]) and far-
right (Freedom Party of Austria [FPÖ]) political groups af-
ter the latest elections (until May 21, 2019). According
to the argument made by Saalfeld (2005) on the com-
position of government, we should find no major dif-
ference between the Austrian Nationalrat’s and German
Bundestag’s activities on Brexit.
With a view to the role of Euroscepticism, Auel and
Höing (2015, p. 381) argue that strong Euroscepticism
in public opinion provides incentives for MPs to control
their national governments on EU affairs to a greater
extent than when Euroscepticism is weak. According to
this reasoning, NPs’ involvement should be higher when
there is a larger share of Eurosceptic parties in parlia-
ment. Their presence increases electoral incentives and
therefore willingness by MPs to scrutinize EU affairs of
both the Eurosceptic party itself and also other parties
since they do not want to risk electoral costs (Winzen,
2012, p. 2). Thus, a large share of Eurosceptic parties in
parliament should lead to greater NPs’ involvement in
the negotiations of Brexit:
H1. Euroscepticism expectation: A large share of
Eurosceptic party groups in parliament leads to a
more involved NP in Brexit affairs.
Next to Euroscepticism, the role of politicization and
saliency of EU issues has recently taken center stage
in scholarly debate on parliamentary activities (Auel
& Christiansen, 2015; Coremans & Meissner, 2018;
Meissner & McKenzie, 2019). Next to polarization of
opinions and mobilization of a broad set of actors,
salience constitutes a major component of high levels
of politicization (Rauh, 2018). Saliency influences actors’
“willingness to invest political resources” (Beyers et al.,
2018, p. 6). Hence, the expectation that saliency influ-
ences NPs’ scrutiny activities resonates with research
identifying ‘willingness’ or incentives as crucial for par-
liamentarians (Winzen, 2013). Saliency, in general, de-
scribes the importance, which actors attribute to a spe-
cific issue (Beyers et al., 2018, p. 1), or “the extent to
which people [such as MPs] care about political issues”
(Hartlapp, Metz, & Rauh, 2014, p. 27). A salient political
event therefore can be understood as an opportunity for
parliamentarians to invest political resources, whereas
MPs are less likely to invest the same amount of re-
sources where an issue has little saliency.
One way of conceptualizing saliency is reasoning
backwards from the visibility of an issue in public or in
themedia. Thus,MPs invest political resources under the
premise ofmaking these actions publicly visible. They cal-
culate which issues will resonate with the public know-
ing that this resonance will increase their own visibility
(Auel & Christiansen, 2015). This is based on the assump-
tion that MPs need to be responsive to citizens (Raunio,
2011). Hence, they calculate electoral costs of their ac-
tivities, or likewise electoral incentives when investing in
a particular issue (Auel & Christiansen, 2015). Based on
these calculations, NPs decide whether to invest political
resources into a particular issue.
Saliency of an issue can also occur when large domes-
tic groups in a state will be affected by this particular is-
sue (Auel & Christiansen, 2015, p. 270). In this context,
willingness of MPs to invest resources results from a cal-
culation of actual, material costs (Auel & Höing, 2015,
p. 380). They estimate the possible effects of an EU is-
sue on their domestic constituencies. Based on a cal-
culation of these costs, parliamentarians or NPs follow
and act according to particular regional or a national in-
terest in order to remedy or ease the estimated effects
(Closa &Maatsch, 2014, p. 827). Applying this to the con-
text of Brexit, NPs and their parliamentarians are likely
to engage more in parliamentary activities if their coun-
tries are or will be affected by the UK’s exist from the
EU. Hence, greater vulnerability to Brexit increases the
issue’s saliency and thus results in more intense parlia-
mentary involvement in these negotiations:
H2. Saliency expectation: Higher salience of Brexit in
an EU member state leads to a more involved NP in
these negotiations.
4. Assessing NPs’ Formal and Informal Involvement in
EU Affairs
This article conceives of NPs’ involvement in EU affairs
as a continuum from low to high contingent on the use
of formal and informal parliamentary instruments. The
majority of research on NPs in EU affairs focuses on
their formal measures such as binding opinions, meet-
ings in EU-committees or plenary debates (Auel et al.,
2015b; Miklin, 2015; Pollak & Slominski, 2009; Rauh,
2015). Little knowledge exists on informal instruments
such as meetings on EU issues in specialized commit-
tees or direct contacts to the European Commission
(hereafter, Commission; with exceptions, Raunio, 2005;
Rozenberg, 2017).
This article seeks to address this gap of fully un-
derstanding NPs’ involvement by covering both formal
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and informal activities1 to (a) get access to documents,
(b) meet executive actors, and (c) attempt to influence
the executive. Hence, I understand NPs’ involvement in
the Brexit negotiations as a combination of the employ-
ment of scrutiny tools as well as their attempted influ-
ence on executive positions (Table 1).
Major prerequisites for NPs to hold the executive ac-
countable and to engage in EU affairs are (a) access to
documents and (b) consultation of executive bodies in
the form of meetings, hearings or debates. While access
to documents is vital for legislative actors to scrutinize
the executive (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017, p. 76), consul-
tation with executive actors is also crucial in order to
oversee and influence decision-making. In the context
of international negotiations, this implies that NPs have
access to relevant negotiation documents either by the
Commission as the EU’s executive directly or by their na-
tional governments; and that they hold meetings, hear-
ings or debates with executive actors. These parliamen-
tary activities are necessary preconditions for, but do
not automatically lead to (c) substantive influence on po-
sitions of executive actors. Hence, I grasp NPs’ involve-
ment as an ordinal scale increasing from the employ-
ment of parliamentary activities to attempts to reap in-
fluence on governmental positions in the negotiations.
5. Methods, Operationalization and Data Sources
In order to trace NPs’ involvement in the Brexit ne-
gotiations, the article’s research design follows a pair-
wise controlled comparison (Gerring, 2007) of two NPs.
More specifically, I select the Austrian Nationalrat and
German Bundestag from the universe of all NPs in EU
member states, and I thereby select cases of similar in-
stitutional strength (see Section 2) in order to analyse
the impact of Brexit’s saliency (Gerring, 2007). In order
to test the influence of Euroscepticism, I combine this
pairwise comparisonwith awithin-case comparison over
time. In particular, I assess whether an expanded share
of Eurosceptic parties in the Austrian Nationalrat and
the German Bundestag with the Alternative for Germany
(AfD) and FPÖ respectively increases the involvement of
these NPs in the Brexit negotiations before and after the
elections in 2017.
While I hold the institutional strength of NPs in
Austria and Germany constant (see Section 2), Brexit’s
saliency in these countries varies. In order to measure
the degree of saliency, I use vulnerability of these states
to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. According to a re-
cent study by Wen et al. (2018), Germany, at a score of
5.48, will be highly exposed to Brexit and will be affected
Table 1. NPs’ involvement in Brexit affairs.






Access to negotiation documents Reports by government
by national governments Documents circulated in Council
Self-assessed satisfaction with flow and quality of
information
Access to negotiation documents Commission documents




With national governments Discussion on Brexit in EU-committee with members of
in EU-committees national government
Hearings with national delegate in Article 50 Council
configuration
With national governments in Discussion on Brexit in committee on ‘Economics and
specialized committees Energy’
Attendance at political dialogue N/A
with Commission
Informal direct contacts to Meetings of party groups with Barnier




On governmental position Communicate position on party level
On Commission’s position Communicate party group’s position in bilateral
High meeting
1 Formal rules are written down and can be enforced by a dispute settlement mechanism, while informal rules are usually not written down and cannot
be enforced a third dispute settlement mechanism (Stacey & Rittberger, 2003). Hence, I conceive of a formal parliamentary activity as an instrument
which is laid down in formal rules such as reporting duties by the national government to the EU-committee. An informal parliamentary activity, by
contrast, refers to measures not foreseen by formal rules such as bilateral contacts between a political group and the Commission’s negotiation team.
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in terms of exports, services, and the financial sector.
Austria, by contrast, will be much less affected according
to the same study reaching a score at the lower end of
0.77. This is consistent with other Brexit impact studies
such as the ones by KPMG (2017) or the Standard&Poor
Brexit impact index (Gill & Sakhuja, 2016). According to
the latter, Germany is at a relatively high score of 0.8,
while Austria is at 0.3. Based on these data and the
conceptualization of saliency as vulnerability to the UK’s
withdrawal from the EU, I assess Brexit’s saliency to be
high in Germany and low in Austria.
In order to trace NPs’ involvement in the Brexit ne-
gotiations, I triangulate data from official parliamen-
tary documents and semi-structured interviews with 18
staff members and MPs from the Austrian Nationalrat,
German Bundestag, and the EP in Vienna, Berlin, and
Brussels. A first data source is official parliamentary
documents in the form of agendas from both parlia-
ments. I systematically mapped the agendas of two
committees between 2016 and 2018: Regarding the
German Bundestag, these agendas came from the EU-
committee and the specialized committee on ‘Economics
and Energy’; regarding the Austrian Nationalrat, the
agendas from the EU-committee and the main commit-
teewere analysed andmapped. Second, semi-structured
interviews with 18 staff members and MPs of the
German Bundestag, the Austrian Nationalrat, the EP,
and NPs’ representatives to the EP were carried out in
2018. These officials include, in Germany, current staff
members of the parliament’s administration, namely
the EU-committee and the specialized committee on
‘Economics and Energy’, of MPs from all political groups
except for the AfD, as well as EU and trade specialists of
parliamentary groups (Alliance 90/The Greens [Bündnis
90/Die Grünen], The Left [Die Linke], Social Democratic
Party of Germany [SPD], Christian Democratic Union of
Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria [CDU/CSU]).
In Austria, they cover EU and trade specialists of the
political groups, MPs as well as staff members of MPs
from the conservative (ÖVP), social-democratic (Social
Democratic Party of Austria), liberal (The New Austria
and Liberal Forum [NEOS]) political groups as well as the
Greens (which dropped out of the Nationalrat in 2017),
but not the FPÖ. Unfortunately, MPs and staff members
from the AfD and FPÖ were not available for interviews,
partly because the AfD at the time of conducting in-
terviews had no specialists on EU or trade affairs yet.
However, I triangulated interview material with informa-
tion from the committee agendas (see above). Further
to that, I included the following questions in my inter-
view questionnaires to which interviewees across polit-
ical groups and institutional affiliation responded consis-
tently (see Section 8):
Did the AfD’s entry into parliament in Germany
change the committee’s activities with regard to
Brexit? If yes, how?
Did the growth of votes in favour of the FPÖ and their
gain in parliamentary seats change the committee’s
activities with regard to Brexit? If yes, how?
In Brussels, staff members and a MEP of Austrian
and German nationality were interviewed from polit-
ical groups including the social democrats (Socialists
& Democrats [S&D]) and the conservatives (European
People’s Party [EPP]) further to NPs’ representatives
from Austria and Germany. For reasons of confidential-
ity, four interviewees did not want to be cited which is
why I refer to these as ‘background talks’ without identi-
fying their affiliations.
6. The German Bundestag in the Brexit Negotiations
In the German Bundestag, the EU-committee is the lead
committee in charge of scrutinizing Brexit. Most activ-
ities happen on the basis of the EU-committee and
are followed by EU specialists in the political groups.
The conservative group, CDU/CSU, has an internal ‘task-
force Brexit’ (background talk), while other parliamen-
tary groups devote one specialist to following the negoti-
ations next to other EU issues. Furthermore, members of
the committee on ‘Economics and Energy’ discuss Brexit
on an ad hoc basis.
6.1. Access to Negotiation Documents
All MPs, their staff members, and parliamentary group
specialists allocated to the lead committee, the EU-
committee, get full access to nearly all Brexit negotia-
tion documents via the parliamentary database EuDox
(background talk). Access to documents is wide-ranging
and covers documents circulated in the Council, reports
by the government, so called ‘Drahtberichte’ from gov-
ernment about Council meetings, all Commission docu-
ments as well as documents on Brexit circulated among
executive actors (background talk). All interviewees re-
ported a smooth transition of documents and informa-
tion from government to parliament without major con-
troversies (Interview 3, 10, 11). Except for negative re-
ports by two interviewees (Interview 4, 12), all docu-
ments seem to be made accessible in a timely manner
to the full satisfaction of all political groups. This is due
to the fact that access is granted also to those documents
only available in the reading room.
6.2. Meetings with Executive Actors
Even though the EU-committee in the German
Bundestag could not commence its activities over
the summer 2017 and in the aftermath of elections
(September 2017; Interview 10, 11), it developed a
dense agenda of meetings with executive actors from
government and the Commission. Between 2016 and
2018, Brexit was on the agenda of the EU-committee 28
times and four times on the agenda of the committee
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on ‘Economics and Energy’ (Figure 1). Next to discus-
sions in the committee, MPs organized public consul-
tations with academics and experts, met with external
actors like the Irish foreign ministry or a delegation of
the British parliament next to numerous meetings with
members of the national government and the EU’s ne-
gotiation team. Moreover, the negotiation team of the
Commission, once Barnier and once Weyand, reported
to the German Bundestag.
A refined network of informal contacts to executive
actors on a national and EU level complements these of-
ficial meetings. This includes meetings organized by the
EU-committee but not reported in the official agenda
(background talk) as well as informal contacts by the po-
litical groups. In the context of the EU-committee, inter-
viewees reported furthermeetings with a representative
from the ECJ, the British foreign minister (background
talk) in addition to several meetings (not just one) with
Barnier (Interview 10, 11).
Informal contacts of the different parliamentary
groups within the German Bundestag to executive actors
seem to be most extensive in cases of those groups that
are in government, namely the conservatives (CDU/CSU)
and social democrats (SPD). The ‘taskforce Brexit’ of
the CDU/CSU has a whole range of informal meetings,
lunches, and personal contacts to staff members of the
national government, state secretaries, and contacts in
the federal foreign ministry. Additionally, the taskforce
has meetings with staff of the Commission, the negoti-
ation team, including Barnier, and Juncker’s legal advi-
sor. The parliamentary group even talks frequently to
the EU’s counterpart, namely the UK’s negotiation team
and British state secretaries (background talk). The social
democratic political group maintains meetings with ex-
ecutive actors, too. These also include contacts to the
UK such as the British foreign ministry on which occa-
sion the political group receives high quality informa-
tion (Interview 2). Informal contacts appear to be less
intensive for groups in opposition. Nevertheless, they
do exist. An interviewee working for the liberal FDP re-
ported meetings with the British deputy ambassador,
with Katainen, and a planned meeting between the par-
liamentary group and the deputy of Barnier. The polit-
ical groups also organize visits to the negotiation part-
ner as liberal MPs did to meet members of the British
parliament and government (Interview 9). The Green
party group reported talks to the Commission as well as
Tusk (Interview 12). Hence, the German Bundestag’s con-
tacts to executive actors in the national government, the
Commission, as well as even the UK’s government can be
described as highly intensive.
6.3. Influence of Executive Actors
Many of these meetings serve to gather more informa-
tion about the negotiations aswas also affirmedby EP ad-
ministrators in charge of coordinating with NPs in Brexit
(Interview 1-Bxl). One reason for this is that the politi-
cal groups in the German Bundestag have a rather ho-
mogeneous position on Brexit. The political groups agree
on the Commission’s and the government’s red lines in
the negotiations (Interview 2, 5, 9, 12). Nevertheless, at
some of these meetings MPs or their staff members try
to shape the government’s or Commission’s positions
0 5 10 15
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Figure 1. Activities of the Austrian Nationalrat and German Bundestag in the Brexit negotiations. Source: Own
compilation based on the agenda of the Bundestag’s EU-committee, 2016–2018, information provided by an
Austrian MP; and information retrieved from the Austrian Parliament website (‘Parlamentskorrespondenz’), 2016–2018,
https://www.parlament.gv.at/PAKT/PR/.
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in the negotiations in line with their preferences. In a
background talk, an interviewee reported how bilateral
meetings with representatives from the Commission or
the negotiation team serve to communicate the politi-
cal group’s position (background talk). Influence on ex-
ecutive actors’ positions can therefore be described as
informal. One of these positions communicated on a bi-
lateral basis was that the withdrawal agreement with
the UK needs a timewise clearly restricted transition pe-
riod and that it must not include budgetary implications
(background talk). Both items would require ratification
by the German Bundestag.
7. The Austrian Nationalrat in the Brexit Negotiations
Similar to Germany, the EU-committee is the lead com-
mittee regarding the Brexit negotiations in the Austrian
Nationalrat. Scrutiny activities andmeetingswith govern-
mental actors happen on the basis of the EU-committee
(EU-Unterausschuss). Occasionally and where appropri-
ate, Brexit is subject also in specialized committees re-
garding policies affected by the UK’s withdrawal from the
EU. As in the German Bundestag, EU specialists in the
political groups follow the Brexit negotiations. However,
there is no equally fully-fledged structure as in Germany
where one specialist or an entire taskforce was devoted
specifically to Brexit. Parliamentarians in Austria consid-
ered establishing a special procedure in order to scru-
tinize Brexit (Interview 18, 19, 20). Especially the lib-
eral party group NEOS demanded a permanent hear-
ing of experts on the consequences of Brexit for Austria
(Austrian Parliament, 2018). Neither of these two sugges-
tions gathered the necessary majority in parliament and
hence remained without success.
7.1. Access to Negotiation Documents
In the Austrian Nationalrat, all MPs get full access to all
Brexit negotiation documents and reports by the gov-
ernment via a parliamentary EU-database (Interview 18,
19, 20). The level of access is wide-ranging and covers
all documents related to EU issues that are transmitted
to government, including all negotiation documents and
Council documents (Interview 18, 19, 20). The degree to
which parliamentarians are satisfied with the transmis-
sion of information from government to the Nationalrat,
however, is mixed. On the one hand, interviewees con-
firm that the Nationalrat is being continuously informed
by the government without any interruptions or prob-
lems (Interview 15, 21). On the other hand, government
is described as not being cooperative. According to an
interviewee from an opposition party, it lacks interest
in collaborating with the Nationalrat (Interview 22). One
interviewee, for instance, described the massive inflow
of information as problematic in the sense that the gov-
ernment makes no effort to edit it before transmission
(Interview 21).
7.2. Meetings with Executive Actors
The lack of interest by government in collaborating with
the Nationalrat is also reflected in interaction between
MPs and representatives from the national executive in
the context of Brexit. Both on a formal and an infor-
mal level interaction between the Nationalrat and the
government is more limited compared to the German
Bundestag (Figure 1). Since 2016, Brexit has been dis-
cussed in the EU-committee five times in addition to
three plenary debates compared to 14 committee-based
debates in the Bundestag.Meetingswith representatives
from the national government in the EU-committee re-
lated to Brexit happened more than twice as much in
the Bundestag (14 times) compared to the Nationalrat
(6 times). These hearings or meetings were organized
with chancellor Kurz, the finance minister as well as
the Austrian delegate Schusterschitz in the Brexit-related
Article 50 Council configuration. Next to these meetings
with the government, MPs also met external actors such
as the Irish European ministry.
It is interesting to note that the quantity of for-
mal meetings between the Nationalrat and executive ac-
tors from the Commission is apparently higher than in
Germany (Figure 1), whereas informal contacts in the
Austrian case seem to be more limited compared to
Germany. The informal agenda of meetings between
party groups in the German Bundestag and Commission
representatives does not face a similarly established
agenda of meetings in the case of Austria. While in
Germany exchange between the conservative party
group in government (CDU/CSU) and the Commission
was most intensive this does not match interaction
between its counterpart in Austria (ÖVP) and the
Commission. Rather, an interviewee from this political
group reported no informal contacts with executive ac-
tors from the EU level (Interview 15). Interviewees from
opposition parties, in contrast, do report contacts to the
Commission in form of briefings on the level of staff
members or with Barnier organized by the Commission’s
representation in Vienna (Interview 21), in addition
to personal contacts between MPs and Commissioners
(Interview 22). Nevertheless, the amount and intensity
of informal exchange between Austrian parliamentary
groups and the Commission does not seem to match the
German case.
7.3. Influence of Executive Actors
On a substantive level, the Austrian Nationalrat, and
its political groups, has developed no genuine position
on Brexit. Interviewees reported that they ‘took note’
(Interview 15) of Brexit, and that the Nationalrat did not
work its way into Brexit affairs given the trust into the
Commission’s position (Interview 21). There was no oc-
casion reported where parliamentarians tried to shape
the executives’ positions in their favour.
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Comparing the Austrian Nationalrat’s involvement in
the Brexit negotiations to Germany (Table 2), in both
cases the political groups do not yield their full po-
tential of parliamentary rights: Parliamentarians in the
Bundestag and in the Nationalrat do not use reasoned
opinions or decisions in the EU-committee to bind the
government to a certain decision (Interview 18, 19, 20).
This is although the right “to bind the government
in negotiations at the EU level” is “parliament’s ‘main
weapon”’ (Miklin, 2015, p. 403) in Austria and Germany.
Nevertheless, both parliaments obtain full access to all
negotiation documents and get regular debriefings by
government next to meetings with the Commission on
a committee-level. On the level of political groups, how-
ever, the German Bundestag seems to have a more in-
stitutionalized informal procedure to scrutinize Brexit
in form of meetings with government and Commission
representatives compared to the Austrian Nationalrat.
Furthermore, the German Bundestag self-assessed in-
formal influence on some negotiation positions, while
this was not reported by interviewees from the Austrian
Nationalrat. Hence, both parliaments can be consid-
ered to be involved in the Brexit negotiations, but the
Bundestag to a larger extent than the Nationalrat.
8. What Role for Euroscepticism and Saliency in
Explaining Parliamentary Involvement in the Brexit
Negotiations?
What factors help understand the rather strong role of
the German Bundestag in the Brexit negotiations? How
can this be explained vis-à-vis the more limited involve-
ment of the Austrian Nationalrat against the background
of similar institutional strength?
8.1. What Role for Euroscepticism?
The expectation that the entry into parliament of the
Eurosceptic AfD has increased the involvement of the
German Bundestag in the Brexit negotiations does not
seem to hold. First, the EU-committee was more ac-
tive before than after the elections in September 2017.
Before the elections, in 2017, the committee had a spe-
cial procedure in order to scrutinize the Brexit negoti-
ations intensively (Interview 10, 11). According to this
procedure, the EU-committee organized meetings on ev-
ery occasion of bargaining rounds. This special procedure
was not put in place any more after parliamentary elec-
tions. Second, none of the interviewees reported sub-
stantive influence on the activities of committees or po-
litical groups on Brexit due to the AfD’s entry into par-
liament. While some interviewees observe a biting tone
in committee meetings (e.g., Interview 3, 7), other staff
members recognize no change at all (e.g., Interview 2).
Hence, the new share of parliamentary seats of the
Eurosceptic AfD appears to have had no significant in-
fluence on the German Bundestag’s involvement in the
Brexit negotiations.
This observation is consistent with the case of the
Austrian Nationalrat. Following the elections in 2017, the
Eurosceptic FPÖ increased its votes to overall 26 per
cent (Bundesministerium für Inneres, 2017) and was un-
til recently (May 21, 2019) in government with the con-
servative ÖVP. Nevertheless, interviewees consistently
reported no influence of this change on the activities
of the EU-committee whatsoever (Interview 18, 19, 20,
21, 22, 24). The FPÖ is described as relying heavily on
the position of its coalition partner regarding Brexit af-
fairs with no genuine FPÖ-position (Interview 21). Brexit-
affairs continue to be ‘business as usual’ (Interview 18,
Table 2. Involvement of the German Bundestag and Austrian Nationalrat in the Brexit negotiations.





Access to negotiation documents Extensive range Extensive range
by national governments of documents of documents
Access to negotiation documents All negotiation All negotiation




With national governments 14 meetings 6 meetings
in EU-committees
With national governments On ad-hoc basis On ad-hoc basis
in specialized committees
Attendance at political dialogue — —
with Commission
Informal direct contacts to Intensive informal 7 official meetings,




On governmental position Limited and informal No influence attempted
High On Commission’s position Limited and informal No influence attempted
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19, 20). Hence, there is no evidence that the increased
share of Eurosceptic parties led to more involved parlia-
ments in Austria or Germany.
8.2. Vulnerability to Brexit and Its Saliency
In line with the saliency expectation, interviewees re-
ported a higher degree of importance ascribed to
gathering documents and being briefed in the case
of the German Bundestag compared to the Austrian
Nationalrat (Interview 1-Bxl, 3, 6-Bxl). While all NPs were
assigned interest in up to date information (Interview
1-Bxl), the importance attached to his was higher in
Germany than in Austria: German interviewees, for ex-
ample, stated that the Bundestag has a “strong need
for information” (Interview 14) and that parliamentar-
ians regard direct and immediate information as cru-
cial (Interview 3). Therefore, the Bundestag’s office in
Brussels regularly includes news on Brexit from the EU
institutions in its reports to Berlin (Interview 5-Bxl). This
is remarkably different in Austria where interviewees
“took notice” (Interview 15) of Brexit, and where par-
liamentarians are relieved not to be part of the nego-
tiations (Interview 24). Rather, activities or debates in
the Austrian Nationalrat revolve around the long-term,
generic consequences of Brexit such as on the budget
rather than the negotiations on the withdrawal agree-
ment as such (Interview 22).
Other than in EU international negotiations with
Canada on CETA, the reason for attention to Brexit affairs
in the German Bundestag does not lie in ideological po-
larization among parliamentarians. Interviewees consis-
tently reported support for the executive, especially for
the Commission’s chief negotiator Barnier (Interview2, 3,
9). Even the leftist party group’s position on Brexit is to
some extent congruentwith the one of the conservatives
(Interview 10, 11). In the Austrian Nationalrat, Brexit
is also not ideologically contested (Interview 7-8-Bxl).
Activities on Brexit in the German Bundestag do also not
result from public visibility (Interview 4, 5, 15). In other
words, the mechanism through which Brexit receives at-
tention in the German Bundestag (and remained absent
in the Austrian Nationalrat) does not stem from ideolog-
ical contestation or visibility of the topic in the press.
Rather, the difference between Austria and Germany
is their levels of exposure to the UK’s withdrawal and
the resulting regional and national interests which the
German Bundestag represents in the negotiations: MPs
and MEPs were described as ‘lobbying’ Michel Barnier
in favour of regional interests stemming from their con-
stituencies (Interview 2, 9, 6-Bxl). Hence, Brexit res-
onates with individuals, civil society organizations or
business groups in local constituencies (Interview 12).
One interviewee explained its political group’s interest
in smooth trade relations between the UK and its region
Baden-Wuerttemberg which results in parliamentary ac-
tivities on the Irish border issue (Interview 9). Another
interviewee made the example of fisheries in the region
Niedersachsen which resonates with its MEP’s local con-
stituency (Interview 6-Bxl). Domestic groups approach
parliamentarians on specific issues. This is whyMPs seek
constant information to understand the current state of
play of the Brexit negotiations. Next to regional interests,
a genuine German interest seems also to have emerged
over the course of the Brexit negotiations. These national
interests reach out to export, engineering and particu-
larly the automobile industry (Interview 6-Bxl). The au-
tomobile company BMW appears to be a crucial compo-
nent of German interests in the Brexit negotiations as
it was mentioned several times, and the Bundestag de-
votes time to individual meetings with BMW represen-
tatives (background talk). An interviewee affirmed that
the Brexit talks are also about pushing national interests
through (Interview 6-Bxl).
In Austria, in contrast to Germany, Brexit is neither
visible in public nor salient with individuals or civil so-
ciety organizations. Likewise, the country developed no
genuine Austrian interest in the context of the Brexit ne-
gotiations (Interview 21). Rather, Austria abstains from
being involved in the Article 50 talks and puts forward
no specific interests (Interview 21). As elaborated by an
interviewee this is also because there is little interdepen-
dence between Austria and the UK so that Brexit gains
little attention in parliament (Interview 21). The low rele-
vance to domestic groups and the absence of specific na-
tional interests result in an almost complete retraction of
Austria in the Brexit negotiations. This finding resonates
with research on the Austrian parliament which ascribes
to it exceptional institutional strength which is not being
actively used to scrutinize EU affairs (Pollak & Slominski,
2003, p. 723).
9. Conclusion
The Austrian Nationalrat and the German Bundestag are
considered exceptionally strong NPs in scrutinizing EU af-
fairs. Both parliaments used their legislative instruments
to great extent in negotiations of EU trade agreements
such as the one with Canada on CETA. Yet, as this article
shows, their involvement varies in the current Brexit ne-
gotiations.While theGermanBundestag uses formal and
informal contacts to executives, including the national
government, the Commission, as well as representatives
from the UK, the Austrian Nationalrat is less active in the
Article 50 negotiations, especially so on an informal level.
In order to explain this puzzle, I argued that the coun-
tries’ varying vulnerability to the UK’s withdrawal from
the EU explains the different levels of engagement in
the Brexit negotiations. Germany is expected to be more
strongly affected by Brexit than Austria, which is why
the Article 50 negotiations gain more attention in the
Bundestag compared to the Nationalrat. GermanMPs as-
cribed importance to scrutinizing Brexit affairs because
they calculated material costs for the country and its re-
gions stemming from the UK’s withdrawal. Their activi-
ties were therefore directed towards gathering informa-
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tion on the Brexit negotiations and transmitting this to
affected domestic constituencies.
The results of this study are particularly relevant for
two strands in the literature on parliaments in EU af-
fairs. Firstly, the article speaks to theorization of saliency
and its impact on parliamentary behavior. One way of
conceptualizing saliency is through public visibility of a
political issue or event (Rittberger & Schimmelfennig,
2006). Saliency can also be explored through the extent
to which a country will be domestically affected by an
event or an EU decision. Putting it another way,MPsmay
invest political resources because they calculate domes-
tic, material costs arising from a certain issue. Secondly,
the article contributes to research on NPs in the nego-
tiation of EU international agreements on which only a
handful of studies exists so far (Jančić, 2017; Roederer-
Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). Having traced NPs’ involve-
ment in Brexit affairs, the results of this article con-
firm the relevance of saliency for parliaments’ activities
within the realm of EU international negotiations. Given
that the German parliament was actively involved al-
ready between 2016 and 2018, wemight observe amore
engaged Bundestag in continued Article 50 negotiations.
Depending on the vote on the current withdrawal agree-
ment in theUK’s parliament,we can expect an evenmore
active German Bundestag in the negotiations on future
UK–EU relations given that the agreement is most likely
going to bemixed (in case there will be no Brexit without
a withdrawal agreement).
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